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Wilson v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Dep’t, 137 Nev. Adv. Op. 70 (Nov. 18, 2021)1
Tort Law: Proceeding before a citizen review board does not warrant tolling the statute of
limitations.
Summary:
In this appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court considered whether a proceeding before a
citizen review board warrants tolling the statute of limitations pursuant to State, Department of
Human Resources v. Shively.2 The Court concluded that, because participation was not
mandatory, the review board proceeding does not toll the statute under Shively.3 Additionally,
because appellant failed to demonstrate that he acted diligently and that an extraordinary
circumstance prevented him from timely filing his civil complaint in district court, the Court
concluded that the doctrine of equitable tolling does not apply.
Facts And Procedural History:
On August 22, 2017, appellant Curtis Wilson was stopped by two Las Vegas
Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) Officers for an improper lane change. The officers
forced Wilson to stand in front of his car in high temperatures for a significant period of time
while handcuffed. Wilson alleges he was cuffed with such force that his hands and wrists were
permanently injured. Wilson, an African-American, also claims the officers were motivated by
racial animus and released him only after discovering that he was a retired firefighter.
In October 2017, Wilson filed a citizen complaint with the LVMPD Citizen Review
Board (CRB), an advisory board to LVMPD that may refer citizen complaints against police
officers to the LVMPD and make recommendations regarding discipline, as well as review
LVMPD's internal investigations. The CRB referred Wilson’s case to a hearing panel for review
and told him that he could “contact legal counsel to pursue any other legal remedies available” if
he was unsatisfied with the outcome of the hearing. The CRB ultimately found that there was no
policy violation but concluded that the officers had unnecessarily escalated the situation and
recommended additional officer training.
Unsatisfied with the result of the CRB hearing, Wilson filed a civil complaint in district
court against LVMPD and the officers on November 13, 2019. Wilson asserted claims for
battery, false imprisonment, and negligence. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss because
Wilson's complaint was barred by the statute of limitations. Wilson argued that the statute of
limitations was tolled while he sought administrative remedies and that equitable considerations
favored tolling. The district court granted the motion to dismiss, finding that tolling the statute of
limitations was not warranted.
Discussion:
The district court did not err in dismissing Wilson’s complaint
Pursuant to NRS 11.190(4), there is a two-year statute of limitations an action for battery
or false imprisonment, or for “an action to recover damages for injuries to a person . . . caused by
the wrongful act or neglect of another.”4 That period begins to run “when the wrong occurs and a
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party sustains injuries for which relief could be sought.”5 Wilson filed his complaint more than
two years after the wrong occurred, after the statute of limitations had passed. Wilson argued that
pursuing administrative remedies, even when elective, tolls the statute of limitations per Shively.
LVMPD, however argued that Shively does not apply and Wilson was not entitled to the tolling
of the statute of limitations because 1) CRB is not an administrative agency or court, 2) it is not
mandatory to file a complaint with CRB before filing suit in civil court, and 3) Wilson did not
state that there were extraordinary circumstances preventing him from filing his suit on time.
Distinguishing Shively
In Shively, The Nevada Supreme Court held that the statute of limitations was tolled
during the pendency of an administrative hearing when that hearing was required before filing a
civil complaint.6 Wilson, however, was not required to present his case to the CRB before filing
a civil complaint and the Court denied expanding Shively to toll the statute of limitations for
administrative proceedings that are not mandatory, for three reasons: 1) There is no argument to
support the implication that the CRB is an administrative proceeding, 2) in a previous decision,
the Court had determined that the Shively holding should be applied narrowly, 7 and 3) an ad hoc
exception would undermine the intent of the Legislature.
Equitable tolling does not apply
The Court then reviewed the established threshold requirements for equitable tolling of
the statute’s limitations period: (1) the plaintiff was diligent in pursuing the claims, and (2) an
extraordinary circumstance prevented caused untimely action.”8 The Court held that Wilson did
not diligently pursue his claims because he waited over a year and a half after the CRB rendered
its decision to file his civil complaint, without any explanation for the delay. The Court also held
that there was no extraordinary circumstance, beyond his control, that caused the untimely
filing.9 Even if Wilson was discouraged from filing a claim until the CRB hearing concluded,
there is no explanation for why he waited an additional 18 months to file his claims.
Additionally, even the mistaken belief that the statute of limitations was tolled, does not
constitute and extraordinary circumstance.10 Therefore, no extraordinary circumstance existed.
Conclusion:
The Court concluded that per Shively, these circumstances did not provide grounds for
tolling the statute of limitations, and that Wilson failed to establish grounds for equitable tolling.
Therefore, the district court properly dismissed the complaint. Judgement affirmed.
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